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Abstract

The displacement of over five million Syrian refugees in the past six years has
brought much needed attention to issues of forced migration. Today, the majority of the
world’s refugees and internally displaced reside in urban areas of middle to low-income
states, particularly in Asia and Africa. There is, however, a significant gap in research on
self-settled refugees in the Middle East and their integration into host countries. In
addition, much of the literature that does exist focuses on policies regarding labor policies
yet ignores housing and settlement pattern issues and its impact on integration and
community growth. This research aims to provide a historically contextualized analysis
of policies’—specifically housing and employment’s—impact on integration within
Jordan. The research includes an analysis based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index
(MIPEX) in conjunction with an analysis of labor market and housing integration. This
research finds the historical context and institutional barriers for refugees have led to
negative refugee integration outcomes. Syrian refugees in Jordan have been unable to
develop ethnic communities that would facilitate social mobility and future spatial
integration. The paper concludes by suggesting characteristics of an improved refugee
policy regime globally.

Keywords: forced migration, integration/assimilation, policy analysis, protracted refugee
situation
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Introduction
The ubiquitous images of refugees struggling across the Mediterranean or living
in prison-like camps, while important to document, makes invisible how a majority of
refugees across the globe actually live. According to the Refugee Compacts (2017:x)
report, around 76% of the world’s refugees live outside of the typical camp, and have
self-settled in other settlements such as urban, peri-urban and rural areas. This trend is not
new, and existed prior to the UNHCR’s 2009 policy change to address self-settled
refugees. In addition, while western countries—especially Europe—have seen an
increase in refugees fleeing to their borders, over 85% of the world’s refugees continue to
reside within middle to low-income countries in the ‘Global South’ (Huang et al. 2016).
The limited agency of refugees and the increased housing demand creates high
vulnerabilities from a housing perspective within the refugee population. These
vulnerabilities can compound and create more issues such as physically distancing
refugees from refugee specific aid centers (3RP 2016:40). Due to a dearth of research on
these self-settled Global-South refugees, particularly from a housing and settlement
perspective, this research aims to provide an understanding of these unique circumstances
in Jordan.
Refugee situations, which often lead to protracted refugee situations (PRS), are
most often handled by a number of nongovernmental organizations: most prominently the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This is just one pivotal piece to the
international refugee regime: a form of global humanitarian governance that is “no longer
inherently good; instead, it can be associated with either emancipation or domination”
(Barnett 2013:382). Each host country involves a network of UNHCR, non-governmental
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aid agencies, donor states, and the host country itself. Such a broad array of actors creates
diverse policies and practices depending on the host country. As a country with a large
refugee population, as well as a long history as a host state, Jordan provides a unique
opportunity for forced migration policy analysis in regards to refugee integration: one of
the durable solutions set out by the UNHCR.
The Middle Eastern country of Jordan has a unique history as one of the receiving
‘Southern’ states, with steady flows beginning with Palestinians since 1948, to the recent
influx of neighboring Syrians since 2011. The lengthy history, range of policies, and
diversity of refugee settlement patterns makes Jordan an excellent example to examine
impacts of settlement and assimilation policies for forced migrants from an
interdisciplinary perspective.
This study contributes to an understanding of the relationship between history,
policy and outcomes for refugee integration and success. Necessary policy and
institutional reform is required for Syrian refugees to gain access to segregated
ethnic/refugee communities to create social mobility ladders to foster successful spatial
integration and labor market incorporation. I argue this throughout the paper by first
providing an overview of the growing literature on forced migration studies,
assimilation/integration theory, and policy path dependency. I then outline the
methodology, as broken down into three main sections: (1) historical/institutional
context, (2) policy analysis, and (3) outcomes analysis. The first section is based in
political science, adding to the path dependency literature. The second section is more
interdisciplinary, combing political science policy analysis methodology with a
sociological concept of integration. The last section is sociological, contributing a
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sociological understanding of community integration for refugees. I conclude the paper
by offering a broader perspective on housing justice, and global reform for a proactive
prevention of refugee crises as opposed to (necessary) reactive humanitarianism.
Perspectives on Forced Migration and Refugee Integration
Prior to the 2009 policy change, much of the forced migration literature examined
camps and the role they played in providing relief to refugees. The policy shift did not
end research on camps, but allowed for easier access to data on self-settled refugees due
to official UNHCR recognition. The debates on encampment have existed for nearly as
long as the international community has utilized it as a solution to refugee crises
(Chambers 1979; Van Damme 1995; Agier 2002; Hoffmann 2017). Although there is a
near consensus that encampment is problematic since it is a short-term solution to a
permanent or long-term problem, it continues to be a focus in policies and research
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:127).
Some more recent arguments have added nuance to encampment criticisms. Van
Damme (1995) looks to the successful use of camps in Bangladesh in 1971, but argues
encampment worked here because the problem was temporary. As examined in a
previous section, temporary has become the exception in refugee situations that continue
to go on for longer periods of time. In addition, according to Jacobsen (2001:7),
governments and relief agencies tend to prefer camps because it makes “management of
assistance easier” and allows for easier transition to repatriation: one of the durable
solutions promoted by the UNHCR. She also argues that the context of the refugee
situation in relation to the host community may sometimes call for encampment policies
(Jacobsen 2001:10). In cases where camps occur or are necessary, participation in camp
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planning by the target population can help promote self-sufficiency within the camp
population (Stevenson & Sutton 2012; Bulley 2014). While these add nuance to anticamp literature, the harsh critiques on UNHCR’s focus on camps and disregard for selfsettled refugees led to their 2009 policy change, and the 2014 addition that the
organization will avoid encampment whenever possible.
Instead, sociologists, political scientists, and forced migration experts alike have
begun to focus on other solutions for refugee crises that take a longer-term perspective
(Jacobsen 2001; Phillimore & Goodson 2005; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014). The
UNHCR asserts three pillars of durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement,
and local integration (UNHCR). Due to humanitarianism’s nature as defined by “the
treatment of symptoms and not causes of suffering, and by standing clear of politics”,
voluntary repatriation is often unrealizable by UNHCR efforts unless the conflict
miraculously ends. Resettlement is barely more attainable as, according to the UNHCR,
less than one percent of refugees are submitted for resettlement (UNHCR: Solutions).
As a result, researchers and NGOs see integration as the most attainable ‘durable
solution’, yet Jacobsen (2001) noted it as a ‘forgotten solution’. Hovil (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh
et al. 2014) argues that it is not forgotten, but in fact evaded by national and international
actors. Integration efforts and their subsequent successes and failures are highly based on
the socio-political context of the protracted refugee situation. This solution also goes
further than simply integrating refugees physically into the host community, or by
providing citizenship. While both greatly facilitate and often allow for integration, they
alone “[do] not necessarily translate into inclusion for former refugees” (FiddianQasmiyeh et al. 2014:489). Ager and Strang (2004:5) describe a group as integrated when
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they have public outcomes similar to the host community, are socially connected with the
host community and its state functions, as well as having sufficient cultural knowledge
and shared notions of citizenship. This is facilitated when the refugee population has
similar social and cultural structures to the host community (Phillimore & Goodson
2005:1722).
Citizenship—and host countries’ withholding of this privilege—can often act as a
substantial barrier to de facto integration, as is the case of Gazan refugees in Jordan
compared to their West Bank counterparts although Perez (2011:1041) asserts that by
demanding citizenship, Gazans “are tacitly accepting the idea that rights are the exclusive
privilege of citizens.” Others have argued, “those with formal legal status do not seem to
do much better than those without legal status” (Jacobsen 2006:282). While debates
continue on the relevance of citizenship in relation to integration, many agree that
successful integration relies on a host community that is open to the forced migrant
population (Jacobsen 2001; Jacobsen 2006; Phillimore & Goodson 2006; Valenta &
Bunar 2010; Gibson 2015; Kattaa 2016b).
Enacting policy change can also pose a challenge for several countries with
existing refugee populations. Many political scientists study the processes for creating
and implementing policies, analyzing this in cases of policies over time and the ability of
institutions to reverse policies or take other policy paths. An analytical framework to
understand these processes is path dependency. Path dependency is an analytical term
aimed at understanding policies over extended, and substantial stretches of time.
According to Margaret Levi (1997), path dependency means, “that once a country or
region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high” (p. 28). For a country
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such as Jordan, which has had refugees since 1947, this temporally long policy regime
can be worrisome for refugees finding a home their today.
Additionally, Pierson argues, “Politics is based on authority rather than exchange.
Thus in politics, institutional constraints are ubiquitous” (2004:34). Interestingly, the
process of creating new policies “is, in the nature of things, to displace institutions, norms
or routines that exist”—just as Syrian refugees were displaced from their homes (Orren &
Skowronek 2014:5). As a result, the forcibly displaced often find themselves in a
situation of ‘sticky’ policy displacement due to the long history of policies and their
institutional disadvantages. Steinmo and Watts argue the “institutional context explains
(and could be used to predict) future policy failures and successes (1995:330). In the
context of refugee policies, one can examine the institutional context of refugees versus
host community nationals, to understand and predict future policies regarding the forcibly
displaced.
Integration
Others, predominantly (but not exclusively) sociologists, have looked at
complexities within integration efforts. Soh et al. (2016) differentiate integration from
assimilation, separation, and marginalization. The most important distinction is between
integration: “when [refugees] keep both home and host identities while still interacting
with the host community”; and marginalization: “when [refugees] neither have home nor
host identity” (Soh et al. 2016:6). Lack of de jure integration (such as citizenship) and
lack of refugee concentrations (urban enclaves/ghettos) can lead to loss of concrete
identity from host or home and results in marginalization.
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Literature on immigrant communities often examines how differing levels of
social segregation shape social life. Due to “the initial disadvantages associated with
immigrant status…they [immigrants/refugees] usually form their own ethnic enclaves” as
a response to “obstacles in crossing the threshold to the large society” (Min Zhou 1992:
2; Abrahamson 2006:131). The concept of social segregation in the form of an enclave as
a means of protection and self-promotion is consistent in literature on the subject
(Abrahamson 2006; Yee 1996; Wacquant 2012; Portes & Zhou 1993). This often follows
an understanding of the oppressive outcomes that also result from these ethnically
segregated neighborhoods and ghettos. Loïc Wacquant outlines four cornerstones of these
outcomes: Stigma, Constraint, Spatial confinement and Institutional parallelism (2012:7).
Additionally, segregated communities hinder integration with the host society due to a
lack of contact between groups. According to Meier, “More diverse neighborhoods and
more encounters with difference lead to more intergroup relations and lower prejudice”
(2017:253). The formation of segregated ethnic enclaves can lead to social mobility
within the community, but prejudice from without.
The successful integration of these communities is often predicated on the
housing rights they have access to. For example, in Istanbul, the law dictates that
squatters cannot be evicted from their homes if it is sound construction with the resident
already moved in. This unique law can provide poorer communities with a chance to
thrive, and one particular woman stated that, “without squatting she would either be
homeless or hungry” (Neuwirth 2006:150). Many assimilation theorists describe ethnic
enclaves as a pivotal stepping-stone for labor market incorporation, but these are not
uncritically understood as a pathway to integration (Min Zhou 1992:15). Integration
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theory, on the other hand, explicitly includes structural methods to incorporate migrants
into labor markets (Schneider & Crul 2010:1144). Interestingly, Wessel et al. (2017)
argue labor market participation is the main driver of upward spatial mobility and
integration into the larger society (p. 834).
Logically following these theoretical claims, the following syllogism must be
true: If ethnic enclaves beget economic integration, and economic integration begets
spatial integration, then segregated ethnic (or refugee) enclaves beget overall integration
into host communities. As Desmond (2016) explains, these are all possible only in cases
of residential and community stability, which can be difficult for poor families “because
they are evicted at such high rates. That low-income families move often is well
known”—a fact researchers have overlooked in regards to policy impacts (p. 296).
Refugee communities reflect many of the issues faced by these immigrant communities,
but have some distinct characteristics as well. Without the mobility ladders offered by
these ethnically homogenous communities, refugees, immigrants, and other new arrivals
face a high chance of downward assimilation.
Patterns of Settlement
According to the Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies,
“social integration has been a central theme in sociology” and they call for the sociology
of evictions “to be an expanding issue within studies of forced migration” (FiddianQasmiyeh et al. 2014:90 & 95). Stephen Castles (2003) calls on sociologists to examine
social policy and human agency in refugee settlement through an interdisciplinary and
historical lens. Additionally, Jacobsen (2006) calls for the need “to address the specific
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vulnerability of refugees, [and] the resources and strategies they employ to reduce this
vulnerability, and the impact of these changes on the host society” (p. 279).
Among research on urban or self-settled refugees, there remains “a
disproportionate focus of research on formal camps” even though it is well understood
that the majority of refugees, globally, reside in self-settled areas (Bakewell 2008:433).
The majority of self-settled refugee literature examines the labor market within different
regional contexts (Jacobsen 2001:15; Phillimore & Goodson 2006; Young & Jacobsen
2013; Kattaa 2016a; Kattaa 2016b) With the literature that does exist on self-settled
refugees, there lacks research on the impacts of different policy strategies for refugees
and host communities (Polzer 2008:476; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:94; Huang et al.
2017:29). The dearth of integration research is often limited by region as well with a
large focus on Africa and industrialized western countries, while “the Middle East
remains largely under-examined” (Kattaa 2016a:8). There remains a clear but shrinking
gap on integration policies in the Middle East in forced migration literature.
Local integration is often regarded as an attainable durable solution for refugees,
but it does have its limits. Jacobsen (2001) alleges that there are contextual and political
restraints to integration. She states, “where local integration aggravates existing security
problems, or adds to the economic and social problems and instabilities in the RHA, it is
neither fair nor feasible to expect that integration be pursued” (p. 24). Her argument is
important to note, but over emphasizes the negative impacts of refugees and misses the
economic opportunities they can bring. Although, that is not to diminish her argument
that self-settled refugees can cause increased demand for housing, leading to price
increases, and “poorer local people may be forced out” as well as other refugees
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(Jacobsen 2001:17). These housing issues are a reflection of the “forms of nichegentrification” that Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah (2012:152) examined in their analysis
on the effects of refugees and conflict on city growth in Nyala, Darfur. These authors
utilize the term niche gentrification to describe a unique, homogenous group experiencing
gentrification as a group. The niche gentrification refugees face adds to the need for an
expansion in the study of the sociology of evictions in forced migration literature
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:94).
Furthermore, allowing for refugees to self-settle—while often cheaper than
encampment—can work against attempts by the host government “to secure financial
aid” due to a lack of visibility of urban refugees (Turner 2015:393). Protracted Refugee
Situations often require large amounts of donor money, and host governments are less
likely to accept integration policies if it decreases international funds. Moreover, a widely
noted problem with integration lies in this invisibility, which makes it more difficult for
aid agencies to provide necessary services to self-settled refugees (Ward 2014; Hoffmann
2017; Huang et al. 2017). Scholars continue to regard integration as an excellent solution
while understanding its limitations.
This research works to fill the current gaps in forced migration literature on the
importance of housing and settlement patterns to integration by combining sociological
understandings of urban social life and a political science policy analysis. In addition it
fills the missing literature on the Middle East region’s disproportionate refugee
population. By focusing on settlement vulnerabilities—in relation to its ability to amplify
or diminish the agency of the target population in Jordan, this project assesses the impact
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of various policies on refugees and their host communities and thereby shed more light
on questions of labor, housing and integration of forced migrants in Jordan.
Methodology
Using Jordan as a case study, I conduct a policy analysis as well as a subsequent
outcomes analysis to understand the extent of refugee integration within Jordan. To
understand the analysis, a grasp of what refugee integration means is paramount. Refugee
integration refers to the process of “legal, economic, social and cultural incorporation of
refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship” (Jacobsen 2001:1). The analysis utilizes
this definition to determine if the policies and outcomes in Jordan have fostered
successful integration or hampered Syrian refugees access to successful, integrated
livelihoods.
In this study, the analysis investigates the impacts of Jordan’s refugee housing
and labor policies as applied toward the current Syrian refugee population in regards to
integration. Ager and Strang (2004) created an ‘Indicators of Integration’ framework for
assessing integration policies. The authors encourage the flexible use of the framework in
regions outside the original use (2004:2). The framework consists of ten domains, under
four headings. ‘Means and Markers’ contains employment, housing, education and
health. ‘Social Connections’ contains social bridges, bonds, and links within and out the
different communities and structures. ‘Facilitators’ contains cultural knowledge and
security/safety. Finally, ‘Foundation’ refers to the rights and citizenship aspect of
integration (2004:3).
I utilize this framework similarly to Velenta & Bunar’s (2010) State Assisted
Integration paper in which they analyze the integration of refugees in Norway and
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Sweden, and pay closer attention to the housing and economic ‘Means and Markers’;
however, due to the path dependency of these policies, instead of comparing two separate
countries’ policies I analyze the current policy regime within the historical context of
Jordan and the UNHCR’s history of refugees. I focus mainly on the policies and
outcomes targeted at the more recent Syrian refugee population within Jordan. I give
special attention to the housing domain to provide a deeper understanding of ‘niche
gentrification’ and the sociology of housing within refugee/host community relations.
This portion of the analysis will draw from Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah’s (2012) City
Growth Under Conflict Conditions in which they utilize rental data to understand the
impact of a refugee crisis on urban growth. This furthers the reflections on structure and
agency by providing a look at what options—or lack thereof—refugees face in regards to
housing, and how policies shape those opportunities.
First I provide a historical and institutional context of Jordan’s refugee policy
regime through a lens of path dependency to understand the reasoning behind Jordan’s
current policies, as well as predictions for reform in similar fashion to Steinmo & Watts’
(1995) analysis of failed health care reform in the United States. Next, I investigate the
core principles of the refugee policies in relation to integration. To do so, I utilize the
Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) excel tool to analyze the level Jordan’s
policies promote, or hurt integration of its refugee population within the two ‘policy
areas’ of economics and housing. Originally designed for immigrant integration
assessment into European and western countries, I edited some of the wording of the
MIPEX tool to closer fit refugees in Jordan. In cases where no mention of the score
requirement was found, this resulted in a score of 0.
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I turn my attention to outcomes of integration into the labor market. To analyze
this, I look for “significant differences between immigrants and the native population in
aspects of everyday life—from labor market participation and income” to how refugees
are “represented in low-income/low-status occupations” in relation to the host community
(Valenta & Bunar 2010:470-1). I then conduct an in-depth analysis of housing/settlement
outcomes through “collected information on changes to the housing sector from urban
planning agencies and rental agents” allowing for a rigorous understanding of “the forms
of social dislocation within the city” with data from the Jordan Department of Statistics
and the REACH organization in Jordan (Bartlett, Alix-Garcia & Saah 2012:153).
Similarly to the labor market analysis, I compare rental data between Jordanian nationals
and the refugees in their host communities. I continue this analysis by running
regressions between average rents and different variables such as households and
population to understand specific causations of disparities in rent. Finally, I utilize data
on security of tenure for host community refugees compared to Jordanians, as well as the
previous findings to address their access to community building and effects of evictions.
I compiled a variety of data sources, and juxtaposed these data against select
policies relevant to conduct the analysis. UNHCR distributed maps, among other NGOprovided resources, along with census data provided by Jordan’s Department of Statistics
(JDOS), allows for the housing and settlement analysis to understand if Syrian refugees
have been successfully building and joining communities. While Jordan’s census data
gather information on refugees, it is not their primary focus. Due to gaps in this data, I
utilize numerous reports from the UNHCR, Overseas Development Institute (ODI),
International Labour Organization (ILO), Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF),
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and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to fill in refugee specific gaps to analyze
integration, specifically economic/labor integration.
While the methodology aims to do a lot, it is necessary for a complete and
coherent analysis of the integration of refugees within Jordan. These different pieces
contribute toward each other, as each one influences the other. This analysis is possible
due to the extensive pre-existing data, which is collected on refugee circumstances in
association with the distribution of aid services. This analysis brings a deeper
understanding of effective integration policies in regards to housing and labor in middleincome countries to promote the livelihoods of forced migrants.
Historical Context
UNHCR Policy Overview
The overemphasis on camp refugees has not simply been a result of media
portrayal. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ was founded in 1950 as
a response to the refugee crisis from World War II. Its goal was to help the millions of
displaced Europeans, but has since expanded its mission to its current goal to aid the
world’s forcibly displaced. Although that was its mission, it has largely ignored a major
component to refugee issues. Official UNHCR policy did not—until 2009—address
urban, and self-settled refugees. Instead, the UNHCR solely utilized encampment to
address refugees. For example, in 2005, only 25% of the world’s refugees lived in camps
yet only 3 years earlier “officially designated camps [were] reported to contain altogether
87.6 percent of the refugees assisted by the UNHCR” (Dorai 2007:3; Agier 2002:320).
Specifically in the Middle East, a region in the Global South host to a large portion of the
world’s displaced persons had (in 2005) 60% of its refugees residing in urban areas,
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“representing a 35 percent increase since 1950” (Ward 2014:81). The global trend in
urbanization makes it “unsurprising that the displaced follow suit” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et
al. 2014:139).
Since its founding, the UNHCR had not specifically addressed urban refugees
until it created the UNHCR Comprehensive Policy on Urban Refugees in 1997. The
concept of aid as a pull factor into cities, and urban refugees as a detriment to host
communities informed this largely criticized policy (Ward 2014:79). Instead, the
humanitarian organization used encampment as its main solution to large displacement
into countries in the Global South. In 2009, after receiving severe criticisms for its policy
stance regarding urban refugees, the new Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in
Urban Areas states that the UNHCR will provide assistance to refugees in urban areas
with or without the authorities approval of their residence there (Turner 2015:389). This
policy represents the beginning of a shift regarding forced migration away from “the
establishment of camps, wherever possible” and towards more durable solutions such as
local integration (UNHCR 2014:6). UNHCR policy had a long history of ignoring urban
refugees, and the extended period of this policy made it all the more costly to implement
a policy reversal, according to path dependency theory. Although the UNHCR’s policies
have shifted, it is only one actor within the international refugee regime; the organization
faces an uphill battle against host states that are reluctant to formally accept forced
migrants into host communities and urban areas.
This fact remains as many host countries “turn a blind eye—both to the work and
the exploitation that goes with it—because refugees provide cheap labour” (FiddianQasmiyeh et al. 2014:106) or because they lack the capacity to extract all the self-settled
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refugees living outside camps (Jacobsen 2001:3). This legal invisibility opens up refugee
populations to negative outcomes, which can then negatively impact the host community.
According to the UNHCR’s most recent figures, there are over 60 million displaced
persons, and over 20 million refugees worldwide. As fewer than 200,000 of those have
been resettled, efforts must be focused on creating durable solutions and policies for the
majority of the forced migrant population.
Refugee History Within Jordan
Jordan has played a pivotal role in hosting a large share of the world’s forcibly
displaced. Since 1949, when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)
was formed to provide relief to Palestinian refugees fleeing Israeli occupation, Jordan has
been home to millions of forced migrants. According to the UNRWA, there were over
two million registered Palestinian refugees in 2016, some living in 10 camps, and around
two-thirds living in urban areas. Up until the 1970s, the Hashemite Kingdom—(the ruling
monarchical dynasty over Jordan) was committed to a policy of integration: the kingdom
provided citizenship rights to millions of Palestinian refugees, resulting in about 40% of
UNRWA-registered refugees obtaining equal rights as Jordanian nationals (Soh, You, &
Yu 2016:2). Many of the camps that were created were near or within existing, dense
urban areas that have over time become integrated neighborhoods (Chatelard 2002:2).
While proximity worked in favor for Palestinian-Jordanians, “being housed close to
urban areas doesn’t always result in refugees effectively being absorbed into the local
population” (Finch 2015:55). While encampment policies have been widely critiqued, the
combination with some of the integrationist policies of both Jordan and the UNRWA
allowed for improved outcomes for Palestinian-Jordanian citizens.
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Although it is important to note that the generosity dealt out by the Hashemite
Kingdom at this time was regarded as “an opportunity for the ambitious King Abdullah
of Jordan to fulfill his expansionist goals” (Achilli 2014:236). In addition, the granting of
citizenship rights was not equally distributed for all Palestinian refugees fleeing to the
Kingdom. According to Perez (2011:1031), “at least 120,000 refugees from Gaza Strip
have been denied this privilege for over 40 years”, leaving them disadvantaged compared
to their West Bank brothers and sisters.
The growth of nationalism and militancy among Palestinian refugees led to the
civil war in Jordan known as “Black September”, causing the Kingdom in 1988 to revert
its relationship with Palestinian refugees and the West Bank, depriving them of
citizenship (Achilli 2014:239). Since then, any Palestinian refugees attempting to find
asylum within Jordan risk remaining stateless inside the kingdom or worse, refoulement.
Refoulement is defined in the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees:
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion."
In addition, the UNRWA historically provided basic services to any Palestinian refugees
in Jordan as opposed to the UNHCR, but due to budgetary issues it has reduced social
services since 1997 (Chatelard 2002:2). As Jordan’s policies have slowly reverted against
refugees, these policies have created a path dependency in opposition to the rights that
were once afforded to the West Bank Palestinian refugees. As the temporal distribution of
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these policies goes on longer, the ability to reverse the trend becomes more cumbersome
and near politically impossible.
Recent Refugees
Due to instability across the region from internal and external actors, flows of
refugees have formed and crossed into the Kingdom steadily since the Palestinian
refugees first did in 1948. For example, the Gulf War set an initial wave of Iraqi refugees
into Jordan in the ‘90s. In the 2000s, the U.S. led invasion into this Arab nation set off an
even larger forced migrant population to flee across the region into Syria, Lebanon, Iran,
and around 450,000-500,000 to Jordan (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:592). Unlike the
response to Palestinian refugees, Iraqis were not subject to large encampment policies
(Turner 2015:387). The Iraqi refugees continued, albeit slower, to enter the Kingdom as
the Syrian Civil War forced around five million people to flee the country beginning in
2011.
Jordan was among the neighboring countries to receive a large portion of the
refugees from the ongoing crisis in Syria. The UNHCR has over 650,000 registered
Syrian refugees in Jordan but unofficial estimates place the number around one million
refugees residing in the Kingdom (Briggs 2015:10). The Jordanian government initially
set up a camp to house the Syrian refugees in a small temporary tent community, which
grew to be the 4th largest city in the country and is now known as the al-Zaatari camp (Ott
2015). Around 100,000 of the registered Syrians live in official UNHCR run camps
(mainly al-Zaatari & Azraq camps), with 80,000 in the al-Zaatari camp alone.
All of these refugee crises within Jordan have developed—or are currently
developing—into protracted refugee situations. The nature of conflict over time has
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transformed the nature of refugees’ realities into more permanent situations, although
expectations have not always aligned with reality. The UNHCR has utilized several
definitions for protracted situations, but the current one, accepted by the Jordanian
government defines it as refugees whom have been in exile “for five or more years after
their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable
solutions” (UNHCR 2009:preamble). The UNRWA oversees one of the largest PRS’ in
the world with over four million Palestinians, and the Syrian refugees appear to be
quickly heading toward a protracted situation, with few prospects for ending the conflict,
as policies and funding structures remain short-term.
Jordan’s Policies
While the UNHCR and UNRWA—among countless other NGOs—have played
significant third party roles within the refugee situations in Jordan, the Hashemite
Kingdom still plays a dominant role in deciding the outcomes for refugees within their
borders. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention, signed by over 140 states, and the
subsequent 1967 Protocol, outlined and defined the legal rights of refugees and the
requirements for their protection. Jordan was one of several Middle Eastern states to not
sign either document; however, the Kingdom did sign a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) in 1998, which reasserted some of the definitions in the Convention, but most
importantly agreed to the principle of non-refoulement of refugees (MOU
1998:Translation). While the MOU has been regarded as a step forward for having a
concrete document directed at refugee policy, it has been considered “somewhat
ambiguous within policy frameworks” and not in line with handling protracted refugee
situations due to its identification of Jordan as a ‘transit’ country (Ward 2014:81). The
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Government of Jordan’s position towards refugees greatly varies as time progresses, from
seeing Palestinian refugees as a benefit to society, to semi-protectionist policies for Iraqis
(Chatelard 2002:8) and encampment for Syrians.
These policies over time have created institutional rifts between Jordanian
nationals and refugees and refugee-citizens. According to Clark (2012), “successive
monarchs have provided subsidies to Jordanian tribes and preferentially recruited them
into various parts of the state apparatus” creating a Jordanian tribal elite (p. 360). The
Palestinians have filled the private sector as a result of their exclusion from the tribal
politics of Jordanian public administration. Refugees more generally are institutionally
disenfranchised from participating in this style of democratic governance, leading to
increased inability to promote and implement successful refugee policy reform.
Furthermore, Jordanian municipalities have undergone centralization of many of
their services by the state, leading to decreased budgetary authority (Clark 2012:362) as
well as the rate of public sector hiring to drop “precipitously since the mid to late 1980s
(Assaad 2012:12). With Jordanian nationals losing work in the public sector as
Palestinians, foreigners and other refugees work in the public (and largely informal)
sector, tensions have risen between the two groups; retired army officers publicly
demanded the renunciation of citizenship for Palestinians (Ryan 2010). The institutional
context of Jordanian nationals tribal politics and its exclusion of non-Jordanians provides
insight into Jordan’s refugee policy and the difficulty in reform.
Jordan Compact
Most recently, there have been shifts in Jordan’s official political stance towards
refugees, a potential outcome of foreign influence. In February of 2016, the UK,
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Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations cohosted the London Conference to
find solutions and funding for the ongoing, international Syrian crisis. One of the
outcomes of this fairly successful conference was the Jordan Compact. The Compact is
an agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom and the international community
(including the UNHCR) to create around 200,000 jobs for Syrians in exchange for
increased international support of Jordan’s economy (3RP 2016:46). This represents a
slight policy reversal, which according to path dependency theory would normally be
high cost for Jordan with its longer history regarding policies towards refugees; however,
the international community has shouldered the cost, allowing for the policy reversal.
This falls in line with Jordan’s past of promoting refugees in their borders when it
appears to benefit them economically or politically.
The Compact attempts to turn the “crisis into a development opportunity…rebuild
Jordanian host communities…[and] mobilize sufficient grants and concessionary
financing” (Jordan Compact 2016:1). The compact provided real funding, as well as
specific solutions to some of Syrian refugees’ largest hurdles to success in Jordan. The
most profound outcomes of the Compact include the designation of five development
zones for increased Syrian participation, decreased requirements for work permits, and
simplified rules of origin to open up the EU market to business in Jordan (3RP 2016:47).
These changes to Jordan’s policies are a much-needed reprieve for Syrian refugees
struggling to find work, or work legally.
The Compact does have flaws, and does not truly address the roots of Jordan’s
refugee crisis. First and foremost, these changes do not affect the institutional rights of
refugees in Jordan, only offering a temporary economic solution to a problem that will
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most likely last generations. Second, attaining a work permit still requires the employer
to represent the worker, as well as pay a 10 JOD verification fee, but the more expensive
work permit fee (180-350 JOD) was removed (ILO 2017:23). Leaving the onus to the
employer to represent the worker has been detrimental to Syrian refugees gaining access
to work permits due to a “dearth of employers willing and able to process the paperwork”
(Kattaa 2016b:76). Additionally, Jordan has a “large number of low-quality informal jobs
in construction and services that are mostly being filled by a growing legion of foreign
workers” (Assaad 2012:3). Making permits more accessible may not actually provide
more work opportunities for Syrian refugees due to Jordan’s large informal labor market;
instead, it may act more as a symbolic gesture to this especially marginalized group of
refugees in Jordan.
Other than the Memorandum of Understanding, and the recent Jordan Compact,
the Hashemite Kingdom does not have refugee-specific directives; instead it has referred
to more recent refugees as ‘guests’ and ‘visitors’: names that have “no legal meaning
under domestic laws” (Kattaa 2016a:6). The lack of concrete refugee law has left
refugees in Jordan under many of the same laws and policies that any other foreign
migrant would face. In regards to labor laws, refugees fall under the category of nonJordanians and must go through the arduous permit process to work in the formal sector.
The policy improvements made by the Jordan government should be understood through
the lens of their historical path with refugees: the Hashemite Kingdom promotes refugees
while it is convenient, but over time slowly takes these rights away as it loses its appeal.
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Policy Assessment
Jordan holds a unique position in the world as the country with the highest ratio of
refugees to host population (ILO 2015:9). While the Syrian crisis has only added to the
refugee population, Jordan continues to lack significant policies targeted towards
refugees. The sole document that mentions refugee specific policy is the 1998
Memorandum of Understanding, which addresses important issues such as Jordan’s
official acceptance of non-refoulement for all refugees; however, it officially designates
Jordan a transit-country in regards to refugee resettlement, meaning all refugees are
regarded as temporary guests. This designation, along with an outright lack of refugee
specific policies, means refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan are grouped in with all
other immigrants who live and work in the Kingdom. While both groups represent a
piece of the migrant community, forced migrants face specific challenges such as trauma,
moving with little to no funds, and health issues. This leaves them especially vulnerable
in a country that makes little distinction between the two. This section analytically
addresses the policies themselves, and not the outcomes; moreover, it provides a context
for the outcomes to be understood in later sections. This paper does not analyze overall
refugee integration into Jordanian society, but simply on the policy areas of Labor and
Housing.
The MIPEX tool provides a score out of 100 on each of the indicators. The
scoring for this conforms to the following breakdown:
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Table 1: MIPEX Score Breakdown
Score Rating
80-100 Favorable
60-79 Slightly Favorable
41-59 Halfway Favorable
21-40 Slightly Unfavorable
1-20 Unfavorable
0 Critically Unfavorable
Source: MIPEX (http://www.mipex.eu/play/)

Each policy area (housing and labor) breaks down into several categories to develop the
overall score of integration. For Labor, I chose to omit the two categories on ‘Support’ as
I saw these as European Union specific and unable to conform to a refugee situation in a
middle-income country—unfairly deflating the score. For housing, I chose to omit the
‘Naturalization’ and ‘Language’ categories as they were completely inapplicable to
Jordan’s policies and would have had no impact on scoring. See the Appendices for
further information on how I score each policy area.
Labor/Employment Policy
The Migrant Integration Policy Index, intended for an assessment of migrant
integration in EU countries, allows for an overall score of each countries policy’s impacts
on immigrant integration. Instead of utilizing the entire index for a holistic view of
Jordan’s integration of refugees, I focus specifically on labor/employment, and housing
policies. The core policies that address employment for refugees are the 1973 Residence
and Foreign Affairs Law No. 24, the Investment Law no. (16) of 1995, and the Labor
Law no. (8) of 1996. As previously stated, these laws either make no, or very brief
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mention of refugees and asylum seekers, mistakenly conflating two similar yet distinct
groups (refugees and immigrants).
The MIPEX breaks down the Labor and employment policy assessment section
down into two categories: Access to labor market mobility, and Workers’ Rights.
Jordan’s employment policies’ for refugees receive and overall score of about 55 (out of
100) on the integration index, giving it a halfway favorable assessment according to the
MIPEX scoring breakdown. At face value, this shows that Jordan’s policies toward
refugees (and migrants in general) do not do a significant job at promoting integration
into the labor market, but does not harm integration. Breaking it down, Access receives a
lower score of 40, while Workers’ Rights receives a potentially inflated score of 75. The
Access score is low due to restrictions against foreigners obtaining work permits in
certain professions, as well as the lack of self-employment for foreigners and refugees
(Jordan 1996: Labor Law no. 8 Article 12). These restrictions are coupled with the
complex, and expensive work permit process, which only lasts one year for foreign
workers. I argue that the Workers’ Rights indicator is inflated at 75/100 due to the
realities of work for refugees in Jordan, potentially a result of the restrictive Access
indicator, as well as a limit on the MIPEX assessment.
Housing Policy
The Migrant Integration Policy Index breaks down the Housing indicator—
slightly more than the labor indicator—into: Eligibility, Security of Status, and Rights.
The scores are provided in Table 2.
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Table 2: Housing Indicator Score Breakdown
Indicator

Score

Eligibility

25

Security of Status

14

Rights Associated

50

Overall

23

The overall integration index score for housing policy at 23 is significantly lower than
that of the already low labor policy of 55. A score of 23 puts Jordan’s housing policies at
the lower end of ‘slightly unfavorable’ according to the MIPEX scoring breakdown. This
unfavorable score comes from the overall restrictive policy towards foreign residency in
Jordan, as compared to the Index’s targeted European Union countries. The majority of
the policy that addresses residency for refugees in Jordan is No. 24 Law on Residence
and Foreigners’ Affairs.
The largest factor in Jordan’s low score here is the lack of a legitimate long-term,
or permanent, residency permit. The typical residence permit (10 JOD) only lasts one
year, and must be renewed if the migrant moves to a new address. The longest-term
permit is a five-year residency permit, but this is only offered after the migrant has lived
within the Kingdom for 10 years (Jordan 1973: Law no. 24 Article 22b). The security of
this status received the lowest score of 14, mostly due to a lack of a facilitated process for
permit renewals compared to the original permit request. In other words, every year, or
every time a refugee moves, they must pay the fee as well as provide all of the original
documents required for a permit. Such restrictive policies can lead to its intended
population finding housing illegally, leading to higher risk of exploitation by landlords.
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Rights associated with residency status received the highest score of 50, but I
argue this is another inflated score. The Overseas Development Institute produced a
report mapping out which groups have access to services and assistance in Jordan. While
refugees are not barred from most governmental assistance in regards to public housing,
or rent control, they are not the targeted group, and most of the assistance they receive
comes from NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (2017:19). The dissonance
between policy and implementation of assistance actually harms integration due to the
formation of parallel institutions, even though the analysis shows it has a moderate score
of 50 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2016:146). See appendix for further breakdown of each
indicator and the scoring.
Outcomes
Policy analysis is vital to understanding the legal and institutional opportunities
refugees are afforded, but it does not provide a complete understanding of their
circumstances. With negligible reference to refugees in official policy, the outcomes can
potentially enhance the analysis of refugee experiences within a country home to a
myriad of displaced persons. The following outcome analysis mirrors the policy
analysis—focusing on the two policy areas of employment/labor and housing/settlement
patterns.
Employment Outcomes
The policies regarding the integration of refugees into the labor market in Jordan
received low to moderate scoring, but how does this translate into integration outcomes
for Syrian refugees? Do the policies actually have a profound affect on integration? To
find these answers, we examine some employment statistics, juxtaposing Jordan’s host

Refugee Integration

30

communities and the refugees living within them. Table 3 outlines the 2015
unemployment rate for both groups (including Syria’s pre-conflict rate to ensure this was
not an intervening variable). The year of 2015 was when the best comparable data was
available, but still allows for several years since the conflict to allow refugees time to
settle down and look for work.

Table 3: Unemployment by Gender and Group (2015)
Unemployment

Women

Men

Total

Host Community1

23%

11%

13%

Syrian Refugees2

88%

57%

65%

Pre-Conflict Syria2

27%

17%

n/a

1
2

Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)
Source: International Labor Organization (Staeve & Hillesund 2015:5)

The large difference (61 and 40 percentage points for women and men respectively)
between pre-conflict unemployment in Syria and Syrian refugees’ unemployment in
Jordan reveals that the country of origin is not impacting their current high
unemployment. Additionally, Jordan’s overall unemployment for the year of 2015 is
much lower (by 65 and 46 percentage points for women and men respectively) than that
of Syrian refugees years into their settlement. Such a large divide indicates that Syrians
experience trouble with integration into the employment sector simply by the inability of
finding work. This reflects the finding that Jordan’s employment policies affecting
refugees do little to promote integration.
Syrian refugees ability to find work at significantly lower levels than host
communities gives insight into overall integration for employment; but for those that
have found work, what does that look like and how does it compare to Jordanians? First
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we look at the informality of labor for both groups. As discussed previously, Jordan has a
large segment of the population working informally; therefore, it is vital to understand the
role Syrian refugees play in Jordan’s informal market to understand the integration into
the overall labor sector. Table 4 breaks down informal labor employment.

Table 4: Informal Employment by Gender and Group
% Employed Informally

Women

Men

Total

Host Community

40%

53%

50%

Refugees2

92%

99%

99%

1

1
2

Source: Jordan Department of Statistics: (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)
Source: International Labour Organization (Staeve & Hillesund 2015: 63)

The percentages confirm that Jordan’s labor market has a significant informal market,
with about 50% working informally. The Syrian refugees have largely fulfilled this niche
market, with 99% of Syrians working informally. While both groups have large segments
in the informal labor market, the Syrian refugees clearly have been pushed to work
informally as opposed to pursuing a legal path.
Syrian refugees have largely filled the informal sector, but to truly understand
their integration into employment, one must understand the roles they have filled by
sector of work. The following table utilizes data on work permits issued to Syrian
refugees as an indicator for their work sector breakdown and compares it to data on
Jordanian nationals.
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Table 5: Crosstabs—Employment Sector by Refugee Issued Permits vs. Jordanians
actual sector work (2015)
Work by Sector
Work Permits: Refugees1
Jordanian Nationals2
Construction
Count
3,796
2,430.8
%
8.6%
6%
Services
Count
10,715
26,334.3
%
24.2%
65%
Restaurants
Count
6,011
1,012.8
%
13.5%
2.5%
Industry
Count
8,562
5,023.7
%
19.3%
12.4%
Agriculture
Count
15,095
688.7
%
34%
1.7%
Education
Count
175
5,023.7
%
0.4%
12.4%
44,354
40,514
Total
100%
100%
%
1
2

Source: International Labour Organization: Right to Work
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)

To test if there is a relationship between these variables, I conducted a chi-square
test of independence. In this case, the null hypothesis that there is no association between
the variables refers to an integrated work force. With a calculated chi-square value of
28920.20 and 5 degrees of freedom, we can conclude that the relationship between
refugee status and work sector is significant at the .001 level; therefore, we can reject the
null hypothesis, indicating Syrian refugees have not been able to integrate into Jordan’s
workforce. Agriculture makes up a plurality of the permits Syrian refugees have been
issued. According to the ILO, “Syrian workers in all sectors, except in agriculture, must
have identified an employer who is willing to apply for a permit on their behalf” (ILO
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2017: 39). The lax rules for agriculture create an incentive for Syrians to enter the field,
as it is one of the few attainable paths to legal work.
Work permits are the legal pathways to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan;
however, as we learned prior, this process is not always easy or affordable. As a result,
there is a large number of Syrians joining the informal labor market. To ensure the
previous test for significance was not due to the nature of Jordan’s informal labor, I
conducted a similar test with the addition of estimated informal labor produced by the
International Labour Organization in conjunction with UNHCR estimates.
Table 6: Crosstabs—Employment Sector by Refugee Permits plus Informal labor vs.
Jordanians actual sector work (2015)
Work by
Sector
Construction
Count
%
Services
Count
%
Restaurants
Count
%
Industry
Count
%
Agriculture
Count
%
Education
Count
%
Total
%
1

Work Permits: Refugees1

Jordanian Nationals2

33,772
30.10%

28,723
3.00%

30,070
26.80%

318,836
33.30%

7,517
6.70%

36,383
3.80%

11,556
10.30%

374,369
39.10%

29,060
25.90%

0
0.00%

224
0.20%

199,152
20.80%

112,202
100%

957,466
100%

Source: International Labour Organization (2017:31)
Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)
Note: Due to the different classification of agriculture by Jordan’s Ministry of Labor, the Agriculture sector
for Jordanians is counted as 0.
2
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The calculated chi square value equals 33690.11, with 4 degrees of freedom giving a pvalue of less than .001. As a result, we can reject the null hypothesis and confirm that
neither the formal nor informal labor for Syrian refugees has outcomes that resemble the
host community. The construction sector saw the largest jump with the addition of
informal labor, with a 21.5% increase to represent the sector with the most workers for
Syrian refugees. As only 3% of Jordanians work in the construction sector, this appears to
be a gap that has been largely filled by foreign, informal labor that Syrian refugees have
helped fill. Several sectors saw a percent decrease with the addition of informal work,
such as Restaurants (-6.8%), Agriculture (-8.1%), and Industry (-9%). A decrease could
suggest that these sectors are more structured with better paths to formal work, and less
friendly to informal employment. Agriculture specifically has fewer regulations for
attaining work permits (ILO 2017: 11), resulting in the high permit numbers.
Overall, Syrian refugees work separately from their Jordanian counterparts. They
are disproportionately working in different industries, as well as more informally. These
refugees are building Jordan’s cities, and growing their crops, and serving their food. A
plurality of Jordanians works in public administration and defense: well-paid,
government jobs with social security and other benefits. Syrian refugees, on the other
hand must face the financial burden of legal work, in sectors such as restaurants and the
service industry, as well as the simplified agriculture permits (ILO 2017:31) or as they
often opt to do, choose the informal path in construction where there are fewer job
protections. The type of jobs, and the formality of work influence the income one makes,
leading one to infer Syrian refugees are at a higher risk of making a lower income. The
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following table provides an insight on the income of Syrian refugees in northern Jordan
governorates.
Table 7: Governorate by Income Bracket (2013)
Governorate

No Income

1-150 JOD

Irbid

29%

51%

Madaba

47%

20%

Mafraq

35%

25%

Zarqa

28%

25%

Source: Care Inc. (Washington & Rowell 2013:13)

A large percent, over one quarter for each governorate, make no income at all. The next
category is less useful as it represents such a wide range of incomes, but this chart overall
helps to reveal that the majority of Syrian refugees make 150 JOD or less, which is often
narrowly enough to cover rent in many regions of the country.
This lack of integration has impacts on the economic opportunities for Syrian
refugees and their agency to promote their own economic well-being and further
integration into the host community. The informality of Syrian refugees’ work allows for
lower wages, and less benefits that are required with legal work. Lower income, coupled
with refugees often migrating with little to nothing, leaves them vulnerable to Jordan’s
cost of living. Another divide Syrian refugees face is the rate of poverty. In Jordan, this
equates to making less than 68 Jordanian Dinars per month. According to the World
Bank, the overall poverty rate sits at 14.4%, compared to 86% of Syrian refugees in
Jordan. Care international (2013) produced a report indicating the average shortfall
between income and expenditures for Syrian refugees was 185 Jordanian Dinars (JOD).
This shortfall prevents any wealth accumulation for this vulnerable group, and “over 67
per cent of families are living in debt, owing on average USD 818” (3RP 2016:4). The
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strict limits on labor integration for foreign migrants, including the especially vulnerable
refugees in Jordan—leaves them at greater risk of poverty, and few options for socioeconomic mobility. One of the greatest drains on refugees’ funds is the high rent in
Jordan, and this is the core of the next section of the analysis of the outcomes of
integration.
Housing/Community Outcomes
The policy areas of labor and housing are intertwined, including in Jordan where
housing permits often require prior work permit documents. Although there are some
waivers for refugees and ‘laissez-passers’, the two concepts are interconnected more
broadly as well: living outside camps means refugees face the market rate rental costs in
Jordan with their often unstable income. Low pay and poor working conditions, coupled
with the similarly arduous residence permit process, as well as scant access to housing
assistance or public housing, Syrian refugees are at high risk for shelter vulnerability, low
integration, and difficulty in forming cohesive refugee communities.
An important aspect to housing is cost; therefore I begin this analysis by
examining the rental costs Syrian refugees typically pay. The following table outlines
average rents paid by Syrian refugees in northern Jordan governorates.
Table 8: Average Monthly Rent in JOD by Governorate (2013)
Governorate

Irbid

Madaba

Mafraq

Zarqa

Average Rent

175 JOD

150 JOD

160 JOD

130 JOD

Source: Care International (Washington & Rowell 2013:13)

The table reveals the governorate can play a small roll in the rents a refugee will pay, but
overall there is only a slight variance between the groups. Additionally, if we look back
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at the income for the some of the governorates that correspond to these, a majority makes
150 JOD or less, with a large percent making no income at all. Seeing these numbers, it is
no surprise that Syrian refugees are going into large amounts of debt to pay for their
livelihoods. Only 43% of Jordanians pay more than 100 JOD in rent compared to 86% of
Syrian Refugees; facing greater restrictions to work and live, Syrian refugees also have to
pay higher rates for residences than the average Jordanian national. The disparity in rent
prices may result in a lack of legal protections Syrian refugees have compared to
Jordanian nationals, allowing for landlords to raise rents in exchange for the risk of
renting to a refugee without a permit.
The high rents have not always been that way, and the influx of Syrian refugees
living in host communities has put a strain on the housing market. I examine the effects
of the Syrian conflict on rent prices similarly to Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah (2012).
Figure 1: Average Rent (JOD) (Consumer Price Index) by Year
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Large flows of Syrians began arriving in 2011 and afterwards, and the rent prices made
up a large percentage of their income, and in some cases their entire income. The price
rises at a steady pace until 2010. I roughly use 2011 as the beginning of the Syrian
conflict to act as a reference point for shifts in rental prices. The graph below depicts the
percentage increase year-year during this period.
The average year-year increase during the pre conflict period (2006-2010) falls at
around 2.23%. The post-conflict average rent increase jumps up to 4.16%. For 2014,
rents jumped by nearly 7% in one year. Part of the explosive rental growth could reflect
post-conflict Sudan, where “rental incomes proved to be an attractive option for Sudanese
nationals who already owned housing stock” and raised rents to increase profits in a high
demand market (Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah 2012:160). After 2015, the year-year rate
begins to level out near pre-conflict levels. This could indicate that efforts made by
Jordan and the international community (e.g. the Jordan Compact of 2016) has had
positive impacts on Jordan’s host communities allowing for a reprieve in the fast-paced
housing market.
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Figure 2: Year over Year Average Rent (JOD) Increase (%)
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Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)

Influences on Rent
The following section utilizes map data produced by REACH, a nongovernmental organization providing humanitarian assistance in Jordan. The data covers
around 51,832 Syrian refugees in the Northern Jordan governorates of Irbid, Mafraq,
Jerash, and Ajloun. Collected in 2013, I analyze data regarding average rent, average
household size, population within the basic service unit, and the governorate to
understand and explain the outcomes for Syrian refugee communities in Jordan. I ran a
linear regression analysis to model a relationship between average household size and the
average rent for refugees. Due to variability between governorates, I simply focus this
analysis on Irbid, the governorate with the largest Syrian population in Northern Jordan. I
hypothesize the greater the household size, the lower the rent. Based on a sample of 125
basic service units, I am 95% confident there is a weak relationship, with 5.2% of the
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variation in average rent influenced by average household size. For every step up in
household size, there is an 11.88 decrease in average rent (JOD). In other words, as
household size increases, there is a decrease in the rent Syrian refugees pay. Households
with greater size have more costs to feed and take care of their families, so those refugees
potentially seek out lower rents.
Table 10: Regression Outputs—Household Size vs. Average Rent in JOD (Irbid)
Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable=‘Irbid’)
Correlation Coefficient

.228

R Square (Coefficient of Determination)

.052

b (slope)

-11.88

P-Value

.011

N

129

Std. Error

3.46

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)

Next, I analyze the relationship between population size of Syrians in a basic
service unit (BSU) and average rent. Again, I control for governorate by only inspecting
the effect in Irbid. I postulate the greater the population in a basic service unit, the greater
the average rent. After running the regression, I am 99.9% confident there is a weak to
moderate relationship, with 9.6% of variation in average rent influenced by population
size of Syrian refugees. For every step up in Syrian refugee population, there is a .02
increase in average rent. The rise in rent with the influx of Syrian refugees could be a
result of simple supply versus demand, as well from the lack of residential security for
refugees, resulting in Syrians taking any rent they can get. The bar chart visually displays
the average rent for each of the governorates in this data set. Irbid is the largest
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governorate by Syrian refuge population by a large margin, and this reflects the greater
margin in average rent between Irbid and the other governorates. This provides some
additional, visual indication of a relationship between higher refugee population density
and higher average rents.
Table 11: Regression Outputs—Population (BSU) vs. Average Rent in JOD (Irbid)
Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable=‘Irbid’)
Correlation Coefficient

.310

R Square (Coefficient of Determination)

.096

b (slope)

.020

P-Value

.000

N

129

Std. Error

.005

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)
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Figure 2: Bar Chart—Average Rent in JOD by Governorate (Northern Jordan)

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)

I run a similar analysis between the number of households in a basic service unit
versus average rent. Likewise, I hypothesize an increase in households correlates with an
increase in average rent. Based on a sample of 208 basic service units, I am 99.9%
confident there is a weak relationship, with 7.7% of the variation in average rent
explained by number of Syrian refugee households. For every additional household, there
is a .086 (JOD) increase in average rent. This finding reflects the population and rent
relationship; however, the slope for number of households and rent is slightly higher than
population versus average rent. One explanation could be the large family sizes, leading
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to high populations but fewer households straining the rental market, showing a greater
effect of households on rent than actual population.
Table 12: Regression Outputs—Number of households vs. Average Rent in JOD
(Northern Jordan)
Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable=‘Irbid’)
Correlation Coefficient

.277

R Square (Coefficient of Determination)

.077

b (slope)

.086

P-Value

.000

N

208

Std. Error

.021

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)

Access to Community Formation
These high cost rents and low wages force refugees in Jordan to live without
shelter security, and face a high risk of eviction. Their status as foreign migrants, or
temporary residents leaves them in legally precarious situations as tenants. As a result,
over 40% of Syrian refugees stated they had moved three or more times within the last
year (NRC 2015:13). This is compared to only 4% of Jordanians having moved at least
once in the last year (JDOS). Syrian refugees precarious position leaves them in a
constant state of displacement, without a chance to accrue wealth or build community.
This leads to the “social dislocation” Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah discuss in postconflict Sudan (2012:153). They must constantly find cheaper rent to afford the high cost
of living in Jordan. Concurrently, “70% of Syrian refugees do not have secure tenure,
with many households renting without basic rental agreements” (Goyes, Tolgay & Vidal
2016:4). The lack of agreements leaves Syrian refugees particularly vulnerable to forced
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evictions. This is compounded when renting without a permit, or updated permit—
associated with the strict policy discussed in the policy analysis.
The previous findings that a greater population of Syrians and Syrian households
correlates with higher rents incentivize Syrian refugees to disperse, as opposed to
residentially concentrating into enclave communities. As a result, Syrians struggle to
form areas resembling an ethnic enclave or receive the social mobility those communities
can foster due to high rents and evictions. The lack of formal legal rights regarding
foreigners in terms of housing leaves Syrian refugees in a vulnerable and desperate
position to find affordable housing. The inability to form cohesive communities as
refugees can have negative implications for their integration into the labor market, and
their longer-term spatial integration (Schneider & Crul 2010; Wessel et al. 2017).
Discussion
This paper has investigated the policies and outcomes regarding integration of
Jordan’s Syrian refugee population into the housing and labor markets and their access to
successful integration within the Kingdom generally. This analysis illustrates how
policies can align—or sometimes misalign—with outcomes in the context of refugee
issues. The results indicate a somewhat negative outlook for the Syrian refugee
population in Jordan; however, recent policies have shown the Hashemite Kingdom
potentially reversing its stance towards refugees; time is necessary to see how these
policies are enforced and if they reflect a trend of friendly policies, or the only attempt to
aid refugees in exchange for international aid.
I first examine the policy history of refugee policies in Jordan through a lens of
path dependency. Jordan’s history with refugees is long in comparison to most countries.
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The Hashemite Kingdom is home to one of the largest populations of the Palestinian
diaspora, to which it granted citizenship to a select majority. Although they granted
citizenship, this was dependent upon King’ Abdullah’s desire for expansion into the West
Bank. Other than this gesture, Jordan’s refugee policies have a path dependency towards
taking away rights and assistance to their large, and continuously growing refugee
population.
I find the recent and slight policy reversal towards promoting refugees within the
Kingdom through the Jordan compact a result of foreign influence taking in a percent of
the costs. Due to the long history of these policies, these costs would normally be too
high to reverse according to path dependency theory (Levi 1997:28). The Western
countries that provided the most concessions have much to gain from greater acceptance
of refugees into Global South countries. By aiding countries that take in a
disproportionate amount of the world’s global refugee population, they effectively escape
their moral obligation to take in a refugee population into their borders. The path
dependency of Jordan’s refugee policies should make observers weary of accepting the
Jordan Compact as an institutional shift in their acceptance of refugees as a legitimate,
permanent population within their borders.
I then shift my focus to the actual policy analysis of Jordan’s refugee policy,
assessing specifically the housing and labor market policies through an integration lens
for refugees. My results overall correspond to my expected scenario. The Labor policy
assessment received a ‘halfway favorable’ score on the MIPEX index, slightly higher
than expected. The score is a result of Jordan’s restrictive work permits process (besides
the agriculture sector) as well as the closed professions list the Ministry of Labor upholds
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against a majority of foreigners. The score is slightly higher than I anticipated, due to the
rights indicator not reflecting the realities of Jordan’s labor market The restrictive work
permit process and reality of informality of labor in Jordan negate the rights granted to
legal foreign workers in Jordan.
The housing policy assessment assumed a relatively low score as well due to
Jordan’s historical context of negative refugee policies regime. The assessment followed
suit, and received a lower ‘slightly unfavorable’ score on the Migrant Integration Policy
Index. Jordan has essentially no long term or permanent pathway to residency for
foreigners, and this includes its host community refugees. This corresponds with their
referral to refugees as ‘temporary guests’. Additionally, residential permit renewal is
equally arduous as the initial permit request, as well as required for each change of
address: potentially leading to renting without a permit due to lack of documentation or
funds. This informal landlord-tenant relationship forming from strict policies leaves
Syrian refugees vulnerable to forced evictions, and poor services.
The tool utilized for the policy assessment—the Migrant Integration Policy
Index—was produced to understand how policies affect integration of migrants into
mostly European states. The specific issues refugees face compared to the typical migrant
makes the use of MIPEX imperfect, but the overlap is large enough to provide an
accurate analysis of the policies in regards to refugees in Jordan.
I conduct the policy analysis prior to the outcome analysis to provide a context
within the outcomes can be understood. The first part of the outcomes analysis examines
Syrian refugees’ integration into the Jordanian labor market, postulating a reflection (or
substandard) of the relatively negative policies. I first examine integration into the labor
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force generally through unemployment data, controlling for pre-conflict Syria
unemployment rates. The high disparity between both pre-conflict Syria and current
Jordanian unemployment rate (Syrian refugees having a much higher unemployment rate)
leads to assuming the postulation as true: Syrian refugees are not integrated into labor in
a broad sense. I turn to quality of work by way of informality of work—especially
pertinent for a country with a large informal sector. While Jordan’s host communities
have a large informal sector, Syrian refugees nearly double this proportion: a sign that
those Syrians that are working are not working at the same quality—or with the same
benefits as legal work (i.e. social security, work contracts etc.).
I continue the labor integration analysis by looking for a segregation of labor by
sector. Utilizing a chi-square test of independence, I found that both formally and
informally, Syrian refugees significantly work in different sectors than their Jordanian
counterparts. This corresponds to the policy analysis and postulated outcome, due to
Jordan’s closed jobs list deliberately barring Syrian refugees (and all foreign migrants)
from a number of occupations that only Jordanians can fill. Additionally, Syrian refugees
must, for the most part, find employers willing to represent them for the expensive work
permit process, or willing to risk hiring them illegally. This follows the institutional
context of work in Jordan, in which there is a divide between public and private work
among Jordanian nationals and refugees, refugee-citizens, and foreigners.
The postulation Syrian refugees make little to no income follows the previous
findings about their ability to find work, as well as the quality of the work. Utilizing
descriptive data on Northern governorates income brackets. Of the four governorates, all
had at least ¼ of Syrian refugees without a consistent income, with one (Madaba) at
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nearly 50%. These figures have lead to this group’s high poverty rate compared to the
host community, as well as the high proportion of families taking on debt. After
examining all of these indicators of labor integration outcomes, I confidently conclude
that Jordan’s labor policies—as well as the institutional framework—have negatively
affected the actual labor integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan’s labor market.
The ability for Syrian refugees to access Jordan’s labor market has a direct impact
on their ability to afford market rate housing, making the housing outcomes analysis the
next logical step in this paper. Additionally, the connection between migrants’ ability to
form ethnic communities and ability to integrate economically allows for a final analysis
of the future of Syrian refugees long-term success. I assume a similarly negative outcome
for Syrian refugee integration into the housing market due to the corresponding policy
analysis, as well as the previous findings for the labor market outcomes analysis.
I begin the rent analysis with a descriptive set of average rent figures for Northern
Jordan governorates (due to the nature of available data, much of this section analyzes
this region; it is also where the largest concentration of refugees reside). The results
reveal a correlation between governorate and cost of housing. When compared to
Jordan’s host community, Syrian refugees actually pay higher rates than their host
counterparts—a possible outcome of their lack of security in housing rights, leading to
landlord-renter exploitation of a marginal group. I utilize Consumer Price Index data on
rent prices on a year-year basis to understand the Syrian conflict’s impact on Jordan’s
rental market. I find that rent increases follow developments in Syria and Jordan, with
rents sharply increasing after the conflict, and slowing down by the past two years—
either a result of efforts by Jordan (Jordan Compact) or a slowdown in Syrian refugees
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crossing over into Jordan. This presents a positive outlook for distressed Syrian refugees
facing rising rents for the majority of their time in Jordan.
To further the understanding of rent increases in Jordan, explicitly Syrian
refugees’ rents, I utilize REACH International’s data collected on Northern Jordan
governorates’ rents and households. I make three hypotheses based on Greulich, Quigley,
and Raphael’s assertion that “a large influx of immigrants may result in substantial
increases in housing prices and rents in those areas” (2004:150). The three hypotheses are
as follows:
(1) As average household size increases, average rent decreases.
(2) An increase in BSU population correlates with an increase in average rent.
(3) As number of households in a BSU increases, average rent increases.
Utilizing linear regressions for all three hypotheses, the results corresponded statistically
significantly with the expected outcomes. The results reveal that household size impacts
where residents live in order to find lower rents for their larger families. Additionally, a
greater population of Syrian refugees, as well as number of households positively
correlates with income, likely resulting from the increased pressure Syrian refugees place
on housing.
I finally turn my attention to Syrian refugees’ ability to concentrate and form
enclaves, while problematic in some ways (including initial spatial integration), they have
been a demonstrated mechanism for mobility ladders and economic and spatial
integration. For this analysis, I examine Syrian refugees’ security of tenure as renters, in
addition to utilizing previous findings. The rate Syrian refugees state they have moved
within the last year far outnumbers Jordanians. Syrian refugees stated they had moved

Refugee Integration

50

homes (at least three times) at forty times the rate Jordanians had moved once within the
last year. This creates a challenge for the formation of community or kinship ties with
other community members as refugees are in a constant state of displacement due to high
rents and low housing security from a policy standpoint. The additional findings that
greater population/households leading to higher rents creates a disincentive for Syrian
refugees to concentrate in these areas as they cannot afford rents as it is.
This last finding has long-term implications for the success of Syrian refugees in
Jordan in terms of labor market integration and eventually spatial integration. The
immediate Syrian refugee dispersal means they skip a typical step in immigrant and
refugee integration: ethnic enclave formation. While spatial segregation into enclaves
inherently opposes spatial integration, it has often been a necessary prerequisite for
integration into the labor market for immigrant communities, which is a necessary step
for spatial integration across class lines (Schneider & Crul 2010:1144; Wessel et al.
2017:831). Without these enclaves to provide mobility ladders for integration into the
labor market, the long-term spatial integration for Syrian refugees seems negligible.
Unfortunately this paper is, for the most part, unable to assess the affects the more recent
Jordan Compact has on Syrian’s housing outcomes; there are indicators (slowdown in
rent increases) that positive outcomes will arise to allow for communities to form.
Due to the inability to actually travel to Jordan and collect data, the methodology
is at mercy to available data on the Internet. Fortunately, Jordan’s department of statistics
provides comprehensive data on Jordan by year—including recent data from 2017--on
areas specific to this study, such as rental, unemployment, and labor statistics. This is a
sufficient resource for understanding Jordan’s host communities, but has limited data
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regarding refugees specifically (reflecting their policies lack of refugee references). This
obligates a reliance on data collected by a variety of actors for refugees, which often do
not have data as current as would be ideal.
Most data was collected most currently in 2015, and some in 2013 (REACH’s
map data, among others). This necessitates the methodology to avoid referencing the
Jordan Compact in the policy analysis because the outcome data will not represent postcompact outcomes. Additionally, the REACH data does not provide geographic size of
the Basic Service Units (BSUs), making an analysis (and controlling for) of density and
other geographic analyses impossible for this study.
Finally, I conclude a relationship among all three sections of the analysis. I
maintain that the historical/institutional framework of refugees in Jordan inform the
policies that are imposed upon them. These policies perpetuate their institutional inability
to participate in policy formation/reform through their negative outcomes on integration
into the Jordanian host communities and labor markets. The policies and institutions that
create roadblocks to ethnic enclave formation, which is their path to success, bar Syrian
refugees from this: labor market incorporation and spatial integration. As a result, the
status quo is perpetual; the Jordan Compact may marginally help Syrian refugees find
work, but this is not sufficient for integration without institutional reform.
Conclusion
Sociologist Matthew Desmond recently wrote in Evicted: “it is hard to argue that
housing is not a fundamental human need. Decent, affordable housing should be a basic
right for everybody in this country. The reason is simple: without stable shelter,
everything else falls apart.” (2016:300). Although he is writing about US citizens in poor
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neighborhoods of Milwaukee, Desmond gets at the heart of the need for stable housing
for everybody, especially those in marginalized positions: it is the bedrock of life;
without it, life falls apart. We can also take it a step further, arguing for accessibility to
not just housing, but also a healthy community.
Jordan’s policies towards a population recently torn from their homes in often
dramatic and traumatizing fashion (Washington & Rowell 2013, table 4:12) disregards
these notions of housing justice. Fortunately, it does accept (nearly) all refugees into its
borders, accepting the international law of non-refoulement. Once across the border,
however, refugees find themselves in a state of stagnation with few routes for growth or
integration. By accepting large segments of refugees but not promoting integration,
Jordan has created a policy of a divided state: one of Jordanian nationals, and one of a
growing and disenfranchised forcibly displaced population. This paper provides insights
into how historical and institutional contexts from policies that affect the communities of
a country.
While it is easy to critique the policies affecting refugees in a country that has a
large refugee population, it ignores the need for countries everywhere to start committing
a fair share to taking in, and housing the world’s refugees. Jordan’s refugee policy regime
may have negative connotations (something worth noting and critiquing) it must be in
conjunction with an understanding of other solutions to the issues refugees face, such as
resettlement to Global North states after arrival to Jordan, as well as repatriation when
applicable. Jordan is the country with the largest proportion of refugees to national
population, reflecting the greater trend of refugees from the Global South forcibly
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displaced for extended periods of time into other countries of the Global South: into low
and middle income countries such as Jordan.
The findings in this study examined what happens after forced migrants arrive to
their destination, but I call for increased research into the causes of refugee crises for an
improved understanding in proactive preventative measures, as well as the Global
North’s role in the global refugee crises: potential causation and reaction. Assessing the
situation reactively is important and must be continued to improve the conditions of
today’s current refugees, and more research must be conducted employing theory as a
foundation; moreover, research must be done in tandem to prevent these conflicts that
create refugees. Preventative measures, and a greater response by the Global North in
accepting refugees into their borders can provide a chance for Jordan to pro-actively
reform its refugee policy regime for the promotion of equality among all residents within
its borders.
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Appendix I: Labor Market Integration Index
LABOUR
MARKET
MOBILITY

ACCESS

Immediate
access to
labor
market

Access to
private
sector

100

50

0

Can legal
migrant
workers and
their families’
access and
change jobs in
all sectors like
nationals?
What
categories of
foreign
residents have
equal access to
employment
as nationals?
a. Permanent
residents
b. Residents on
temporary
work permits
(excluding
seasonal)
within period
of ≤ 1 year
c. Residents on
family reunion
permits (same
as sponsor)

Are foreign
residents able
to accept any
private-sector
employment
under equal
conditions as
nationals?

Score

Comments

40

All of them

Yes. There
are no
additional
restrictions
than those
based on
type of
permit
mentioned
above

A and (C or
certain
categories of
B)

Other
limiting
conditions
that apply to
foreign
residents,
e.g. linguistic
testing
(please
specify)

Only A or
None

Certain
sectors and
activities
solely for
nationals
(please
specify)

50

1973 Residence
and Foreigners’
Affairs Law
instructs Jordanian
nationals and
companies not to
employ foreigners
without a valid
residence permit.
Although some
exceptions are
made for political
asylums (Law no.
24 Article 35)

0

The government
closes certain
professions off to
foreign workers.
The professions
that are officially
closed are
administrative and
accounting,
clerical,
telecommunicatio
ns, sales, most
technical
professions,
including
mechanical and car
repair,
engineering,
education and
some professions
in hospitality (MOL
2016).
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Access to
public
sector

Immediate
access to
self
employme
nt

Access to
self
employme
nt

Are foreign
residents able
to accept any
public-sector
employment
under equal
conditions as
nationals?
(excluding
exercise of
public
authority e.g.
police,
defense, heads
of
units/divisions
but not
excluding civil
servants and
permanent
staff)

a. Permanent
residents
b. Residents on
temporary
work permits
(excluding
seasonal)
within period
of ≤ 1 year
c. Residents on
family reunion
permits (same
as sponsor)

Are foreign
residents able
to take up selfemployed
activity under
equal
conditions as
nationals?
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Yes. Only
restriction is
exercise of
public
authority
and
safeguard
general
state
interest

Other
restrictions
(please
specify)

Only for
nationals

0

Only Nationals
(refugees not
explicitly outlawed
from public sector,
but insignificant
numbers work in
it….defacto
restricted)*From
the Jordan
Department of
Statistics

All of them

A and (C or
certain
categories of
B)

Only A or
None

50

Only permanent
residents have
access to selfemployment
Article (12) of
Labor Law No. 8 of
1996 specifies that
foreigners must
have work permit
submitted by an
approved
employer. There
are exceptions,
specifically
regarding
investing.
According to the
Invest Law No. 16
of 1995,
foreigners,
including Syrian
Refugees, are able
to invest in certain
sectors: Article
(24)

Yes. There
are no
additional
restrictions
than those
based on
type of
permit
mentioned
in 14

Other
limiting
conditions
that apply to
foreign
residents,
e.g. linguistic
testing
(please
specify)

Certain
sectors and
activities
solely for
nationals
(please
specify)

100

No Additional
Restrictions
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WORKERS'
RIGHTS

Do legal
migrants have
the same work
and social
security rights
like Jordanian
nationals?

Membershi
p in trade
unions

Membership of
and
participation in
trade unions
associations
and workrelated
negotiation
bodies

Access to
social
security

A. Long-term
residents B.
Residents on
temporary
worker permits
C. Residents on
family reunion
permits

Access to
housing

(e.g.,
public/social
housing,
participation in
housing
financing
schemes)
a. Long-term
residents
b. Residents on
temporary
work permits
(excluding
seasonal)
c. Residents on
family reunion
permits (same
as sponsor)
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75

Equal access
with
nationals

All of them

All of them

Restricted
access to
elected
positions

A and (C or
certain
categories of
B)

A and (C or
certain
categories of
B)

Other
restrictions
apply

Only A or
None

Only A or
None

100

Some unions
specifically
advocate for
migrant workers,
and beginning to
advocate for
refugee workers as
well (e.g. the
garment industry)
(Katta 2016a: 20).

50

Most
governmental
social services are
Jordanian only, but
some are
accessible to
refugees, but often
at low rates (ODI
2017).
Additionally, there
are nongovernmental
services targeted
to refugees, but
these are parallel
programs, which
have been noted
to be detrimental
to integration.

50

While not
restricted to social
housing, it is not
targeted towards
refugees, and
separate
organizations such
as the Norwegian
Refugee Council
handles most
refugee housing
assistance needs
(ODI 2017).
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Working
conditions

Do TCNs have
guaranteed
equal working
conditions?
(safe and
healthy
working
conditions,
treatment in
case of job
termination or
dismissal,
payment/wage
s, taxation)

58

Equal
treatment
with
nationals in
all areas

No equal
treatment in
at least one
area (please
specify)

No equal
treatment
in more
than one
area
(please
specify)

100

Refugee workers
with a permit are
under the same
work rights as
nationals (Labor
Law No 24).

Refugee Integration

59

Appendix II: Housing Policy Integration Index Score Card
PERMANENT
RESIDENCE

ELIGIBILITY

Residence
period

100

50

0

Do temporary
legal residents
have facilitated
access to a
long-term
residence
permit?

Required time
of habitual
residence for
permanent
residency

< 5 years

5 years

> 5 years

Score

Comments

25

No
permanent
residence
permits
allowed for
foreign
residents. 5
year permits
= longest
renewable
resident
permit

0

Article 22 (b)
of Law No. 24
states, "The
Minister may,
on a proposal
of the
Director,
grant a
residence
permit for
five years to a
foreigner who
has lived
lawfully in the
Kingdom for
10 years. Not
permanent
but longest
term permit
allowed for
foreigners.
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Permits
considered

Documents
taken into
account to be
eligible for
residence

Time counted
as
pupil/student

Is time of
residence as a
pupil/student
counted?

Periods of
prior-absence
allowed

Periods of
absence
allowed
previous to
granting of
status

SECURITY OF
STATUS

Does the state
protect
applicants from
discretionary
procedures?

Maximum
duration of
procedure

Maximum
length of
application
procedure
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Any foreigner

Permit
Required:
must have
either valid
passport,
or be a
laissezpasser

Additional
requirements such
as
employment/income

50

Yes, all

Yes, with
some
conditions
(limited
number of
years or
type of
study)

No

50

Longer
periods
(please
specify)

Up to 10
nonconsecutive
months
and/or 6
consecutive
months

Shorter periods

0

The only
requirement
(along with
the 10 Dinar
fee: Article 23
of Law no. 24)
for refugees is
to be officially
recognized by
the UNHRC to
be considered
a laissezpasser (Article
4 a & b) and
additional
requirements
such as
employment
are exempt
for refugees
(Article 29 h)
both from
Law No. 24
Admittance to
an
educational
establishment
is grounds for
a residence
permit of up
to one year,
and exempt
from permit
fees (Article
26 g).

Not specified
under
Jordanian
Laws*

14

≤ 6 months
defined by
law (please
specify)

> 6 months
but the
maximum
is defined
by law
(please
specify)

No regulation on
maximum length

0

No Maximum
time listed*

Refugee Integration

Duration of
validity of
permit

Renewable
permit

Periods of
absence
allowed

Grounds for
rejection,
withdrawal,
refusal

Duration of
validity of
permit

Renewable
permit
Periods of
absence
allowed for
renewal, after
granting of
status
(continuous or
cumulative)
a. proven fraud
in the
acquisition of
permit
b. sentence for
serious crimes,
c. actual and
serious threat
to public policy
or national
security,
d. original
conditions are
no longer
satisfied (e.g.
unemployment
or economic
resources)
e. additional
grounds (please
specify)

61

50

Maximum
residence
permit=5
years, only
available after
residence of
10 years.
Regular
permits last 1
year (Law No.
24 Article 22)

Upon
application

Provided original
requirements are
still met

0

Subject to
original
requirements
(Article 22 a-Law No. 24)

≥ 3 years

1 year< , <
3 years

≤ 1 year

0

Not stated in
residence
law*

No other
than a and/or
c

Includes
three of the
listed
grounds

Includes all listed
grounds (a-d) and/or
additional grounds
(please specify)

50

Only states
that original
conditions
must be met
(d) (Article
22a & 28)

> 5 years

5 years

< 5 years

Automatically
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Personal
circumstances
considered
before
expulsion

Expulsion
precluded

a. personal
behavior
b. age of
resident,
c. duration of
residence,
d.
consequences
for both the
resident and his
or her family,
e. existing links
to the State
concerned
f. (non-)existing
links to the
resident’s
country of
origin (including
problems with
re-entry for
political or
citizenship
reasons)
a. after 20
years of
residence as a
long-term
residence
permit holder,
b. in case of
minors, and
c. residents
born in the
State
concerned or
admitted
before they
were 10 once
they have
reached the
age of 18

62

More
elements
than b,c,d
and e

In all three
cases

At least b,
c, d and e

At least one
case

One or more of b, c,
d or e are not taken
into account

None

0

Duration and
family are not
considered*

0

None of these
exceptions
mentioned in
relevant
laws*
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Legal
protection

Legal
guarantees and
redress in case
of refusal, nonrenewal, or
withdrawal:
a. reasoned
decision
b. right to
appeal
c.
representation
before an
independent
administrative
authority
and/or a court

RIGHTS
ASSOCIATED
WITH STATUS

Do long-term
residents have
the same
residence and
socio-economic
rights (e.g. like
EU nationals)?

Access to
employment

Access to
employment
(with the only
exception of
activities
involving the
exercise of
public
authority), selfemployment
and other
economic
activities, and
working
conditions

Access to
social security
and
assistance

Access to social
security
(unemployment
benefits, old
age pension,
invalidity
benefits,
maternity
leave, family
benefits, social
assistance)

63

All rights

At least a
and b

One or both of a and
b are not
guaranteed

0

Article 19: No
explanation
required for
refusal of a
permit
Appeals are
not laid out in
foreigner
residence law
no. 24

50

Equal access
with
nationals and
equal
working
conditions

Equal access
with
nationals

Priority to
nationals

Priority to
nationals

Other limiting
conditions apply

Other limiting
conditions apply

50

Priority to
Nationals-(e.g. 16
professions
list,
restrictions
on selfemployment
etc.) but
working
conditions for
permitted
work is the
same
(Ministry of
Labor 2016).

50

Governmental
assistance
targeted
towards
nationals,
most
assistance is
from UNHCR
or other
humanitarian
organizations
(ODI 2017)
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Access to
housing

Access to
housing (rent
control,
public/social
housing,
participation in
housing
financing
schemes)

64

Equal access
with
nationals

Priority to
nationals

Other limiting
conditions apply

50

Priority to
Nationals,
most
assistance for
for refugee
housing
comes from
humanitarian
organizations
such as
Norwegian
Refugee
Council (ODI
2017).
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